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Kraetzer: Kraetzer: Little Waste Goes a Long Way:

A Little Waste Goes a Long Way:
The Recovery of Response Costs Under
CERCLA
Johnson v. JamesLangley OperatingCo.1
I. INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 2 in 1980 in response to nationally
publicized toxic waste problems CERCLA's purpose is to protect public health
and the environment from the effects of releases or threatened releases of
hazardous substances.4 Thestatute's maingoals aretoprovidethetoolsnecessary
for prompt and effective response to problems resulting from hazardous waste
disposal and to force those responsible for creating harmful conditions to bear the

1. 226 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2000).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994)).
3. H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt_ 1, at 17 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.AN.
6119, 6119-20. These toxic waste problems included Love Canal in New York and
Times BeachinMissouri. Id.;see also John C. Cruden, CERCIA Overview, SE98 ALIABA 807, 808 (2000). From 1942 to 1953, the Love Canal property was a disposal site
for approximately twenty-two thousand tons of chemical waste. Charles de Sailan,
SuperfundReauthorization:AMoreModestProposal,27 ENVT.L.REP. 10201 (1997).
Later, the property was the site of a residential neighborhood and public school. Id. In
the 1970s, an oil recycler who was under contract with local towns and businesses
sprayed dioxin-containing waste oil, as a dust suppression measure, onto local roads,
parking lots, and soil in Times Beach, vissouri. Hazardous Waste Cleanup,27 ENVU.
L.REP. 10475 (1997). The contaminated soil atthis site was incinerated, and thesitewas
completely remediated by July1997. Id. The site is now the home ofthe 409-acre Route
66 State Park Id.
4. 1IR. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.N.
6119,6119-20.
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costs ofremediation.i CERCLA allows private parties to recover response costs6
when such costs are caused by the release or threatened release of hazardous
substances and are necessary and consistent with the National Oil and Hazardous
Substance Pollution Contingency Plan ("NCP").'
In Johnson v. James Langley Operating Co.,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs, in order to impose liability on
defendants, need not show that they incurred response costs by acting to contain
a release that threatened public health or the environment.9 By rejecting the Fifth
Circuit's holding inAmoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc.,"° the court created a circuit

split. This Note argues that the Eighth Circuit's liberal interpretation of the plain
language of CERCLA furthers the goals of the statute more than the Fifth
Circuit's narrow interpretation. This Note also argues that because the Johnson
court did not address the fact that the plaintiffs did not incur response costs until
after the commencement of their lawsuit, the Eighth Circuit opened the door for
landowners to seekrecovery of response costs from potentially responsible parties
when such landowners have not yet incurred such costs.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In January 1998, Dunn L. Johnson, Grover Smith and others" (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Landowners," or separately as "Johnson" and

5. H.R. REP.No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6119; see also, e.g., Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662,
668 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (generally stating CERCLA's goals); United States v. Wallace, 893
F. Supp. 627, 636 (N.D. Tex. 1995) ('The two primary, underlying policy concerns of
CERCLA are (1) Congress' desire to equip the federal government -with tools necessary
for prompt and effective responses to hazardous waste disposal problems of national
magnitude and (2) Congress' desire that those responsible for causing the problems thus
identified bear the costs, and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they
created.").
6. For the definition of response costs, see infra notes 61-65 and accompanying
text.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994). For an explanation of the National Oil and
Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan ("NCP"), see infra notes 68-70 and
accompanying text.
8. 226 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2000).
9. Id. at 962-63.
10. 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
11. This case involves two actions that the district court consolidated for trial.
Johnson,226 F.3dat 959. In the first action, the plaintiffs included Johnson and a group
of forty-four others with interests in real estate in Union County, Arkansas. Id. The
plaintiffs in the second action included Smith and five others. Id.
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"Smith") filed suit against a group of individuals and entities that leased land for
oil and gas production operations (hereinafter "Defendants"), alleging that
Defendants' operations caused Landowners' properties to become contaminated
with "radioactive scales, salt water, oil and grease, heavy metals and other
hazardous substances." 2 Landowners claimed entitlementto response costs under
CERCLA." These response costs consisted of site assessment costs incurred by
Landowners after the commencement of the lawsuit. 4
To supporttheir CERCLA claim, Landowners relied ontwo reports prepared
by Radiation Protection Resources, Inc., in August 1999." In the first of these
reports, author Edwin Cargill stated that four of the five sites tested within the
boundaries of Johnson's property did not display radiation above background
levels. 6 The fifth site,'7 however, revealed elevated radiation levels." In the
second report, Cargill stated that nine of ten sites tested on the Smith property
indicated only background levels of radiation, while the tenth showed elevated
radiation levels.' Using a process described by AL. Smith,'9 Landowners
contendedthattheirproperties were contaminatedwithradioactive substances that

CERCLA deems hazardous.21
Following discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the
CERCLAclaimY' Defendants arguedthat Landowners failed to establish aprima
facie case of liability under CERCLA because Landowners failed to show an
incurrence of cleanup or removal costs due to hazardous substances.?

12. Id.
13. Id. Plaintiffs' claims also included several state-law actions, which are not
relevant to this Note. Id.
14. Id. Although the court does not state the specific nature of the response costs,
the Author presumes the response costs to be those costs associated with the site
assessment reports prepared by Radiation Protection Resources, Inc. See infra text
accompanying notes 15-19.
15. Johnson,226 F.3d at 959.
16. Id.
17. This site was an operating well Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. In a paper presented at the Seventeenth Annual Offshore Technology
Conference in May 1985, Smith stated that water present in an oil and gas reservoir
contains dissolved mineral salts, a small proportion of which may be naturally
radioactive. Id. "[A]s the oil and gas are depletedthroughproduction, water is produced
in the reservoir, resulting in the deposit of mineral scales containing measurable
quantities of natural radioactivity into the oil production system." Id.

21. Id. at 959-60.
22. Id. at 959. Defendants also moved for dismissal of the state claims. Id.
23. Id. In addition, Defendants arguedthat their crude oil operations were excluded
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In September 1999, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Arkansas, relying upon a decision from the Fifth Circuit,24 concluded that, for
Defendants to be held liable under CERCLA, Landowners needed to show that the
levels of hazardous materials on the properties posed a threat to public health or
the environment.'
The district court said that Landowners could have
accomplished this by showing that the materials were present in levels that
violated applicable state or federal law.26 Although the district court concluded
that Landowners had failed to provide evidence that radioactive substances were
present at such levels, it declined to grant summary judgment on the CERCLA
claimY The district court, instead, instructed Landowners to submit additional
evidence that, at the very least, would raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether
the release or threatened release of hazardous substances had caused the
incurrence of response costs that were necessary and consistent with the NCP.28
In October 1999, the district court issued its second decision, in which it
evaluated the additional evidence presented by both parties in response to the
September ruling.' The district court determined that the substances Landowners
contended were released 0 were hazardous substances under CERCLA.3 1 The
district court also reiterated its September ruling that, in order to recover response
costs, Landowners must create a genuine issue of fact as to whether they incurred
those costs by acting to contain a release threatening public health or the
environment.32 The district court concluded that Landowners failed to show

from CERCLA under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). Id. This section specifically excludes
petroleum, including crude oil, from the definition of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14) (1994).
24. Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
25. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 960.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. The NCP is CERCLA's primary regulation. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v,
Reilly Indus., Inc., 215 F.3d 830, 835 (8th Cir. 2000); Cruden, supra note 3, at 807. It
is "comprised of EPAregulations that set forth procedures and standards for responding
to releases ofhazardous substances." Union Pac., 215 F.3d at 835. For a more in-depth
discussion of the NCP, see infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. In addition to the
court's denial of summaryjudgment onthe CERCLA claim, the court denied Defendants'
motion for summary judgment by virtue of CERCLA's petroleum exclusion and granted
Defendants partial summary judgment on Landowners' personal injury claims. Johnson,
226 F.3d at 960.
29. Id.
30. Radium-226 and -228, cadmium, lead, and xylenes. Id.
31. Id. The court also ruled that the xylenes were subject to the petroleum
exclusion. Id.
32. Id.
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contaminationin excess of applicable standards and granted Defendants summary

judgment on the CERCLA claim. 3
Landowners appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the court
erred in adopting the standard established by the Fifth Circuit in Amoco.' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court and rejected the decision of the Fifth Circuit, to the extent that those
decisions burdened Landowners withthe costs oftesting and sampling inresponse
to a release or threatened release of hazardous substances? 5 The Eighth Circuit
held that CERCLA's plain language does not incorporate any quantitative
threshold for the imposition of liability.3" Rather, for Landowners to be entitled
to response costs, such costs mustbe caused by an actual or threatened release of
hazardous substances, and must be necessary and consistent with the NCP

IH. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. An Introduction to CERCLA
In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA38 in response to nationally publicized
toxic waste problems, including Love Canal in New York and Times Beach in
Missouri2 9 Congress reauthorized and amended CERCLA when it enacted the

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986." "CERCLA
substantially changed the legal machinery used to enforce environmental cleanup
effortse" and filled gaps left in an earlier statute, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976.42 CERCLA's purpose is to protect and preserve public
health and the environment from the effects of releases or threatened releases of
hazardous substances.43 Two primary goals of CERCLA are (1) providing the
33. Id. at 961.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 962.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 963-64.

38. Pub. L. No. 96-510,94 Stat 2767 (1980) (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994)).
39. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
40. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
41. Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664,667 (5th Cir. 1989).
42. IR. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6119-20. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 can be found at
Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat 2795 (1976) (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994)).
43. ILR. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119,6119-20. Section 9601(14) defines "hazardous substance" as:
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tools necessary for prompt and effective response to problems resulting from
hazardous waste disposal, and (2) forcing those responsible for creating harmful
conditions to bear the costs of remediation."
Because CERCLA aims to facilitate clean up, the statute imposes strict
liability on a variety of parties-regardless of their culpability.4" To establish
CERCLA liability, a plaintiff must prove:

(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33,
(B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated
pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the
characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 6921] (but not including any waste the
regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 6901 et
seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed
under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E)
anyhazardous air pollutant listed under
section 112 ofthe CleanAir Act [42 U.S.C. § 7412], and (F)any iniminently
hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the
Administratorhas taken actionpursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term
does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which
is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) ofthis paragraph, and the term does not
include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas
usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).

42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994).
44. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.AN. 6119,6119; Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662,
668 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Wallace, 893 F. Supp. 627,636 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
45. See 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (1994); see also, e.g., Hydro-Mfg. Inc. v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 903 F. Supp. 273, 276 (D.R.I. 1995) ("The legislation is designed to impose strict
liability on a variety of actors... irrespective of their culpability, because the aim of
CERCLA is to facilitate repair and clean up.'). Section 9607(a) imposes liability upon:
(1)the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3)anypersonwho by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, ofhazardous substances owned orpossessed by suchperson, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated
by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any personwho accepts or accepted anyhazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incinerationvessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or athreatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
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(1) defendant is within one of four classes of covered persons
enuiueratedby42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)[-](4); (2) areleaseorthreatened
release of a hazardous substance from a facility has occurred; (3) the
release or threatened release caused plaintiff to incur response costs;
and (4) those response costs were consistent with the National
Contingency Plan (NCP), 40 CFR §§ 300.1.1105 (1999).!
The only defenses to liability are an act of God, an act of war, and an act or
omission of a third party."
B. Timeliness ofFilingSuit
CERCLA allows private parties who incurred necessary response costs
consistentwiththeNCPto seekrecoveryfromthe party orparties who causedthe
offending condition.' To recover costs under this statute, however, a plaintiff
actually must have incurredresponsecosts." In Lewis v. GeneralElectric Co.."
the plaintiff conceded that she had not yet incurred such response costs. 1
Therefore, the court found premature the plaintiff's claim to recover response

costs and dismissed it for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
grante-2 The court stated that the plaintiff could reassert her claim if she
incurred response costs at a later date.53 Similarly, in Weyerhaeuser Corp. v.
Koppers Co..' the court held that, to prove a prima facie case of CERCLA
liability, "the plaintiffmustprove that ithas incurred at least some costs which are
'
in compliance andhencerecoverable." 55
The courtfurther said thatitmakes sense
to impose a pleading requirement that a plaintiff must allege at least one type of

46. Johnson v. James Langley Operating Co., 226 F.3d 957, 961-62 (8th Cir.
2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994). For the statutory language, see infranote
65. For an in-depth discussion of response costs, see infra notes 61-96 and
accompanying text. In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1994) allows the United
States, states, and Indian tribes to recover costs of removal and remediation that are not
inconsistent with the NCP.
49. Lewis v. General Elec. Co., 37 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 (D. Mass. 1999) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4), which states that the release must "have caused the incurrence of
response costs").
50. 37 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D. Mass. 1999).
51. Id. at 62.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 771 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Md. 1991).
55. Id.at 1414.
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response cost cognizable under CERCLA to establish a prima facie case."
Finally, in Colorado v. Asarco,Inc.," the court said that the similar language of
Section 9607(a)(4)(A)58 had been interpreted to require a plaintiff to "begin the
cost ofthe clean-up and incur some expenses before it [could] initiate an action." ' 9
In Asarco, Colorado's pleading that it had incurred costs of sampling and
analytical services was sufficient to justify the filing of its lawsuit.'
C. Response Costs
One of CERCLA's key provisions permits both governmental and private
parties to recover from responsible parties the costs incurred in cleaning up and
responding to hazardous substances.6 Althoughthe definition of"response costs"
does not appear in CERCLA's definitions section,62 the statute defines "response"
as including removal actions.63 "Removal," in turn,includes "such actions as may
be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of
hazardous substances."'
CERCLA allows private parties to recover such
response costs 65 when two conditions are met. First, the response costs must be

56. Id.
57. 616 F. Supp. 822 (D. Colo. 1985).
58. See infra note 65.
59. Asarco, 616 F. Supp. at 829 (citing United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103,
1110 (D.N.J. 1983)).
60. Id.; see also Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1406, 1414 (D.
Md. 1991) (stating that courts consistently have held that investigative costs incurred
prior to the lawsuit are sufficient to bring suit).
61. Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989).
62. Avnet, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (D.R.I. 1992).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1994).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1994).
65. As stated in the text accompanying note 62, the definition of "response costs"
is not found in 42 U.S.C. § 9601. Section 9607(a)(4), however, indicates that response
costs include:

(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,

including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release; and

(D)the costs ofanyhealth assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 9604(i) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D) (1994).
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caused by an actual release or a threatened release of hazardous substances.'
Second, the response costs mustbe necessary and consistent with the NCP.' The
NCP is CERCLA's primary regulations and is "comprised of EPA regulations
that set forth procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous
subsfances." Like CERCLA, the NCP was designed to promote cost-effective
measures to protect public health and the environment 70
Courts consistentlyhave held that CERCLA should be construed liberally in
order to effectuate its remedial goals.71 When determining ifresponse costs are
recoverable, courts agreethat CERCLA's plain language does notincorporate any
quantitative threshold into its definition ofhazardous substances' InAmoco Oil
Co. v. Borden,Inc.,73 the Fifth Circuit concurred that CERCLA's plain language
fails to impose any quantitative requirement for hazardous substances! 4
However, the Amoco court found that a threshold for liability was suggested by
the requirement that a release or threatened release "cause[s] the incurrence of
response costs.'" 5 According to the Amoco court, to justify the incurrence of
response costs, "one necessarily must have acted to contain a release threatening

66. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994).
68. See Cruden, supranote3, at 807; see alsoUnionPac. R.R. Co. v. ReillyIndus.,
Inc., 215 F.3d 830, 835 (8th Cir. 2000). The NCP is codified at 40 C.F.R Part 300
(2001).
69. Union Pac., 215 F.3d at 835.
70. Id.

71. See, e.g., Town of New Wmdsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662, 668
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
72. See, e.g., A&W Smelter & Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107,1110 (9th

Cir. 1998); United States v. AlcanAluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711,720 (2d Cir. 1993);
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 260-63 (3d Cir. 1992); BY.
Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1199-1201 (2d Cir. 1992); Amoco Oil Co. v.
Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 1989).

73. 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989). Amoco sought response costs, including site
investigation, from Borden, from which Amoco had purchased "as-is" a 114-acre tract

of land. Id. at 666. This land, allegedly unbeknowst to Amoco, contained a thirty-fiveacre pile of inactive phosphogypsum. Id. Some of the waste contained more than five
hundredtimes the background level ofradiation. Id. This level ofradiation exceeded the
limits set bythe Inactive Tailings Standards. Id. at 666, 671. Under the Uranium Mill
Tailings Radiation Control Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA")
promulgated the Inactive Tailings Standards, codified at 40 C.F.R § 192.00-.43 (2001),
to determine hazardous radionuclide levels. Id. at 667.
74. Id. at 670.
75. Id.
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publichealth orthe environment.' ' 6 Conceding that it was entering new territory,
the Amoco court held that:
[w]hile not the exclusive means of justifying response costs,.., a
plaintiffwho has incurredresponse costs meets the liabilityrequirement
as a matter of law if it is shown that any release violates, or any
threatened release is likely to violate, any applicable state or federal
standard, including the most stringent.7"
The Fifth Circuit applied its Amoco holding in Licciardi v. Murphy Oil
U.S.A., Inc.7" In Licciardi, the plaintiffs sought response costs-the costs of
hiring a number of environmental testing and consulting firms to assess their
property-incurred due to the release of a "black tarry substance"' 9 from the
defendant's refinery."0 The district court determined that the level of lead
concentration in the soil exceeded background levels and awarded the Licciardis
their response costs." The Fifth Circuit, however, found that the district court's
reference to "background level" was not the proper legal standard.' In addition,
the court found that the drinking water standard and the toxic concentration
leaching procedure standard were not applicable standards for the alleged
release.' As a result, the court held that the Licciardis' response costs were not
justified because the above-background lead levels did not violate any applicable
legal standard.'
The First,8 5 Third,' and Ninthe7 Circuits criticized the approach taken by the
Fifth Circuit in Amoco. Because the outcomes of these cases were based on
different issues, however, the courts did not go so far as to hold that the Fifth
Circuit's approach was incorrect.' In UnitedStates v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 9

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.

Id.
111F.3d396 (5thCir. 1997).
Presumptively, this "black tarry substance" was refinery sludge, found by the

district court to have come from the defendant's refinery, that contained lead in above-

background levels. See id. at 397-98.
80. Id. at 397.

81. Id. at 397-98.
82. Id. at 398.
83. Id. at 398-99.
84. Id. at 399.
85. Acushnet Co. v. Mohasco Corp., 191 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 1999).
86. Unitea States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992).
87. A&W Smelter & Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 46 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
88. InAlcan, a contribution case, the court determined that CERCLA contained no
quantitative threshold for the term "hazardous substance." Alcan, 964 F.2d at 260. The
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the Third Circuit explained that CERCLA is plain on its face and courts need not
resort to legislative history to uncover its meaning." Nevertheless, the Alan
court said that the legislative history is "barren of any remarks directly revealing
Congress' intent vis-a-vis a threshold requirement on the definition oflhazardous
substances." 91 Importantly, the available legislative history indicates that
Congress created the statute to force all polluters to pay for their pollution?2 The
Alcan court concluded that it "is difficult to imagine that Congress intended to
impose a quantitative requirement on the definition of hazardous substances and
thereby permit a polluter to add to the total pollution but avoid liability because

the amount of its own pollution was minimal.'
Seemingly following the reasoning of the Alcan court, the First and Ninth
Circuits agreed that the Fifth Circuit, by requiring that pollution pose a threat to
the public or the environment,read too much into the word "causes' in Section
9607(a)(4).9 According to the Ninth Circuit, which decided A&W Smelter &
Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton," the Fifth Circuit "imposed a minimum level
requirement through the back door." 6
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
InJohnsonv. JamesLangleyOperatingCo., a case of first impression inthe
Eighth Circuit,the court addressed whether private parties' response costs under

court did not discuss this threshold with regard to releases that "cause the incurrence of
response costs," the language that theAmoco court found determinative. Id.at 264; see
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, 889 F.2d 664, 670 (5th Cir. 1989).
TheAcushnet court, while addressing whether an otherwise responsible partymay
escape CERCLA contribution, discussed whether CERCLA liability attaches upon the
release of any quantity of hazardous substances. Acushnet, 191 F.3d at 78 n.9 In so
doing, the court criticized the far-reaching approach taken by the Fifth Circuit. Id.
In denying summary judgment in favor of the EPA, the Smelter court discussed the
lack of a minimum-level requirement in CERCLA's definition of hazardous wastes.
Smelter, 146 F.3dat 1110. In dicta, the court criticized the Fifth Circuit's imposition of
a minimum-level requirement through a strained reading of the causation requirement
Id.
89. 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992).
90. Id. at 260.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Acushnet Co. v. Mohasco Corp., 191 F.3d 69,78 n.9 (1st Cir. 1999); A&W
Smelter & Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998).
95. 146 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
96. Id. at 1110.
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CERCLA are justified and recoverable only when the release threatened public
health or the environment." The court held that Landowners could recover their
assessment costs when hazardous substances were released, even if the quantity
of such release was not in excess of any applicable legal standard. 9
First, the court noted the elements that must be proved by a plaintiff to
establish CERCLA liability. 99 The court then explained that "the thrust of
defendants' Amoco argument is that CERCLA plaintiffs' response costs are
justified and recoverable only where the release threatened public health or the
enviroment." 1e0 Next, the court outlined the Fifth Circuit's decision inAmocoY 1
According to the court "the Fifth Circuit held that CERCLA response costs are
caused by a release or threatened release-and thus may be recovered in a
CERCLA action-only where such costs are justified by proof that a release
threatened public health or the environment."" ° The court noted that the Fifth
Circuit "specifically rejected the argument that liability automatically attaches
upon the release of any quantity of a hazardous substance."" e The court
recognized that the Fifth Circuit did not identify a minimum requirement;
however, the Fifth Circuit said that showing that a release violates any applicable
4
state or federal standard would meet the liability requirement.1
The courtthen explained the Fifth Circuit's subsequent decisioninLicciardi,
in which the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs' evidence of elevated lead
levels failed to show that the release posed a threat to the public or the
environment. 5 InLicciardi,the plaintiffs had shownhazardous substances above
background levels, but not
in excess of any legally applicable or relevant and
°6
appropriate requirement.

97. Johnson v. James Langley Operating Co., 226 F.3d 957, 962 (8th Cir. 2000).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 961-62. These elements are:
(1) [D]efendant is within one of four classes of covered persons enumerated
by 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)(4); (2) a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance from a facility has occurred; (3) the release or threatened
release caused plaintiff to incur response costs; and (4) those response costs

were consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP), 40 CFR §§ 300.1.1105 (1999).

Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 962.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

105. Id.
106. Id.
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The court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's Amoco andLicciardidecisions
"to the extent that they saddle [landowners] withthe costs of testing and sampling
in response to a release or threat of a release of hazardous substances."'" The
court explained that CERCLA plainly contemplates liability for site assessment
and that its plain language does not incorporate any quantitative threshold into its
definition of hazardous substances. 03 The court further explained that imposing
a minimum-release level would go against Congress's policy decision that the
threat posed by hazardous substances does not depend upon a minimum
concentrationl 9 The court recognized that the statute has internal limitations to
ensure that response costs are justified and that private recovery actions for
expenses incurred in
site evaluation "do not become a vehicle for wholly
'1 °
speculative testing.
The first of these limitations is that response costs must be caused by an
actualrelease or threatenedrelease."' Plaintiffs maynot recover whenthe release
or threatened release involves only excluded substances, including petroleum." 2
The court then addressed Defendants' contention that the response costs at issue
were not caused by a release, asserting that Landowners failed to commence site
assessment until after filing suit." The court rejected this assertion, finding that
the response costs were nottransformed into litigation costs merelyby their timing
with respect to Landowners' initiation of this action." 4
The second limitation is that response costs be "necessary" and consistent
with the NCP to be recoverable by private parties."' For the costs to be
necessary, parties musthave an objectively reasonable belief thatthe defendants'
release or threatened release of hazardous substances would contaminate their
property." 6 Testingmethods that are scientifically deficient or unduly costly are
not "necessary."" The court held that, because CERCLA contains its own
limitations to ensure that response costs are justified and necessary, Landowners
were not required to show that they incurred costs by acting to contain releases
that threatened public health or the environment"'

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 963.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 963-64.
Id. at 964.
Id.
Id. at 962-63.
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V. COMMENT
A. Timeliness of FilingSuit
In Johnson, the Eighth Circuit allowed Landowners to continue with their
lawsuit seeking CERCLA response costs, even though Landowners had not
incurredresponse costs priorto bringing suit." 9 Instead, the Landowners hired
an environmental consultant to assess their properties more than one year after
filing suit.120 Although it did not specifically address this issue, the court, possibly
inadvertently, opened the door for private parties to file suit against potentially
responsible parties for response costs that they have not yet incurred.
CERCLA's language requires landowners to incur response costs before
filing suit.'
In addition, courts consistently have interpreted the statutory
language to require a plaintiff to incur actual expenses prior to initiating a legal
action.

122

In Johnson,however, Landowners did not incur their response costs prior to
filing their suit to recover such costs from Defendants." It is unclear from the
Eighth Circuit's opinion whether Defendants argued that the district court should
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. If
Defendants failed to make this argument, then the court may have been justified
in ignoring this issue. It is also possible that the court did not see the point in
dismissing the claim because the response costs had been incurred by the time the
case went to trial.12 ' Regardless, it is noteworthy that Landowners were not
seeking a declaratory judgment for recovery of future response costs.
Landowners, in fact, claimed entitlement to response costs under CERCLA when
no response costs had been incurred."
By allowing this action without
specifically addressing the timeliness issue, the Eighth Circuit opened the door for
landowners within the circuit to file claims for CERCLAresponse costs when they
have not yet incurred such costs. If this result is one the court intended, it is a

119. See id. at 959.

120. Id.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994). According to this section, response costs
include "any other necessary costs of response incurredby any other person consistent

with the national contingency plan." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994) (emphasis
added).

122. See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
123. See Johnson, 226 F.3d at 959.
124. This is an assumption made by the Author based on the date of the district
court's ruling in September 1999. It is noteworthy, however, that courts generally do not
extend jurisdiction, after the institution of a lawsuit, simply because the jurisdictional
threshold was subsequently satisfied. See infra note 126.
125. See Johnson, 226 F.3d at 959.
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clear deviation from the language of the statute and rulings of other courts. Ifthis
result is not onethe courtintended, the court should clarify its position specifically
in a future opinion so that the law-is made clear. 6
B. Response Costs
In Johnson, the court held that CERCLA's plain language does not
incorporate any quantitative threshold for the imposition of liability.'" Rather, for
Landowners to be entitled to response costs, these costs must be caused by an
actual or threatened release of hazardous substances, and theymustbe necessary
and consistent with the NCP." In so holding, the court rejected previous
decisions of the Fifth Circuit,' holding that plaintiffs must show they incurred
costs by acting to contain a release that threatened public health or the
environment. This circuit split likely will result in confusion as to how
CERCLA's plain language should be interpreted in the future. However, future
courts can relieve this confusion by following and upholding the Eighth Circuit's
liberal interpretation of the statute, which furthers the policy goals of CERCLA
more than the Fifth Circuit's strict interpretation.
Courts have determined whether plaintiffs can recover CERCLA response
costs in four situations. The first situation exists when unnecessary site
assessment'3 reveals no defined hazardous substances.' In this situation, it is
clearfrom CERCLA's plainlanguage that landowners cannot impose liabilityfor

126. In Trimble v. ASARCO, Inc., decided only two months after Johnson,the
Eighth Circuit againaddressed thetimeliness issue. Trimblev.ASARCO, Inc., 232 F.3d
946 (8th Cir.2000). In Trimble, the plaintiffs brought a class action against ASARCO,
alleging that ASARCO's smelting and refining operations had contaminated their
properties. Id. at 950. The United States District Court for the District ofNebraskaheld
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' CERCLA claim because the
plaintiffs had failed to allege that they had incurred response costs consistent with the
NCP. Id. at 950-51. The Eighth Circuit converted this motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matterjurisdiction into a motionto dismiss for failure to state a claim and upheld
the district court's ruling because theplaintiffs hadnot established a keyelementfortheir
CERCLA claim-the incurrence ofresponse costs. Id. Itis noteworthythat the Trimble
court did not cite Johnson inits discussion of this timeliness issue.
127. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 962.

128. Id.
129. Licciardi v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 111 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 1997); Amoco
Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
130. Response costs are necessary only when the recovting parties had an
objectively reasonable belief that the defendant's release or threatened release of

hazardous substances would contaminate their properties. Johnson, 226 F.3d at 964.
131. For the definition of hazardous substances, see supranote 43.
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response costs on other parties.132 The second situation exists when landowners
with either an objectionably reasonable belief for investigation or simply an
irrational fear discover hazardous substances in quantities that surely will pose a
public health hazard. In this situation, plaintiffs may recover their response costs
from all responsible parties.'
The other two situations exist when the landowners have an objectively
reasonable beliefthatthe defendant's activities contaminatedtheirproperties. The
two situations thatresult are: (1)the site assessmentreveals no defined hazardous
substances, and (2) the site assessment reveals small quantities of hazardous
substances. In both situations, the Fifth Circuit would not allow plaintiffs to
recover their response costs because the hazardous substances did not exist in
levels exceeding an applicable legal standard."3 The Eighth Circuit, however,
would allow recovery in both situations. 3 '
Evaluating this "middle ground," theAmoco court held that "[w]hile not the
exclusive means of justifying response costs,... a plaintiff who has incurred
response costs meets the liability requirement ... if it is shown that any release
violates, or any threatened release is likely to violate, any applicable state or
federal standard.... "136 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit narrowly construed a
statute that the courts consistentlyliave said should be construed liberally in order

132. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); see also SouthemPac. Transp. Co. v. California,
790 F. Supp. 983, 984 (C.D. Cal. 1991) ("Before CERCLA liability may be imposed, it
must first be demonstrated that a hazardous substance, as defined under CERCLA, is
involved.").

133. See generallyElfAtochemNorthAmerica, Inc. v.United States, 868 F. Supp.
707 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (1he government owned facilities that emitted three waste streams:
"1) hydrochloric acid plus organics piped from an [ ] absorber to the waste pond, 2) black
sulfuric acid plus organics piped from a [ ] reactor to the waste pond, and 3) reddish
sulfuric acid plus organics including DDT particles and unreacted monochlorobenzenes
from a sight box in a [ ] reactor to the waste pond."); HRW Sys., Inc. v. Washington Gas
Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318 (D. Md. 1993) (Coal-tar and other hazardous substances,
including polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons and light aromatics, were present below the
ground. "Long term exposure to either of these components has been linked to increased

risk of cancer.'); Rhodes v. County of Darlington, 833 F. Supp. 1163 (D.S.C. 1992)
(Plaintiffs showed a release of benzene in unacceptable levels.).

134. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 671 (5th Cir. 1989).
135. See Johnson, 226 F.3d at 962.
136. Amoco, 889 F.2d at 671 (emphasis added).
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to effectuate its goals. 7 In essence, the Fifth Circuit imposed a minimum
threshold "through the back door."'
CERCLAwas enactedwiththeprimarypurpose ofprotecting andprserving
the environment from the effects of releases of hazardous substances."n
Legislative historyindicates that Congress created the statute to force allpolluters
to pay for their pollution. 4" The most effective way to accomplish this goal is to
hold polluters liable, regardless of the quantitative concentration of hazardous
substances. Therefore, the Amoco court misinterpreted the purpose of CERCLA
by imposing a minimum-threshold requirement.
Another goal of CERCLA is the discovery-through site assessment and
testing-ofhazardous substances."1 At the same time, it is not in society's best
interest to encourage wholly speculative testing. The Amoco court specifically
rejected the argument that CERCLA liability attaches upon the release of any
quantity of hazardous substances because "adherence to that view would permit
CERCLA's reach to exceed its statutory purposes by holding parties liable who
have not posed any threat to the public or the environment"'" As the Johnson
court recognized, however, CERCLA's language contains internal mechanisms
thatprevent wholly speculative testing.4 First, response costs must be caused by
an actual or threatenedrelease ofhazardous substances.'" This requires, without
the imposition of a quantitative minimum, a showing that there was a release of
a hazardous substance or that such a release was threatened. Second, CERCLA
requires that response costs be necessary and consistent with the NCP.'
Response costs are "necessary" only when the recovering parties have an
objectively reasonable belief that the defendant's release or threatened release of
hazardous substances would contaminate their properties.'" The Johnson court

137. See, e.g., United States v.AlcanAluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252,258 (3d Cir.
1992); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992); 3550 Sten
CreekAssocs. v. Barclays Bank of California, 915 F.2d 1355,1365 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert.denied,500 U.S. 917 (1991); DedhamWater Co. v. CumberlandFarmsDairy, Inc.,
805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986).
138. A&W Smelter & Refiners, Inc., v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir.
1998).
139. IR. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6119-20.
140. Aican, 964 F.2d at 260.
141. HRW Sys., Inc. v.Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318,345 (D. Md.
1993).
142. Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d. 664,670 (5th Cir. 1989).
143. Johnsonv. James Langley Operating Co., 226 F.3d 957,963 (8th Cir. 2000).
144. 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(4) (1994).
145. 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994).
146. Johnson,226 F.3d at 964.
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noted that scientifically deficient or unduly costly testing procedures cannot be
necessary.'47 As a result, the worries of the Amoco court lack justification
because CERCLA's own language prevents abuse by private parties in recovery
actions.
The holdings of Amoco and Johnson create a circuit split. In addition to
creating confusion as to how CERCLA will be interpreted by other circuits, these
decisions mandate that the recovery ofresponse costs under CERCLA will depend
uponjurisdiction. It is unlikely that this result is one Congress intended. Because
national uniformity in the application of CERCLA is crucial in effectuating
Congress's goal of protecting public health and the environment, the Supreme
Court should address the split presented by Amoco andJohnson. Future courts
that address this issue should realize that unlike the Amoco court, the Johnson
court followed the traditionally accepted policies that no quantitative standard
shouldbe imposed on CERCLA andthatthe statute should be interpreted liberally
to effectuate its remedial goals.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Johnson v. JamesLangley OperatingCo., the Eighth Circuit refused to

followthe Fifth Circuit's holding that, in order to recoverresponse costs, plaintiffs
must show that the contamination posed a threat to public health or the

environment. Instead, the court allowed plaintiffs to recover response costs when
hazardous substances, not in excess of any applicable standard, existed on their
property. In so doing, the court finthered CERCLA's primary remedial purpose
of protecting public health and the environment without imposing minimum-

concentration requirements. However, because the court did not specifically
address the timeliness of the plaintiffs' incurrence of response costs, the court
opened the door for plaintiffs to seek recovery of response costs that they have yet
to incur.
CAT

M. KRAETZER

147. Id.
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